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THE RELEVANCE OF "EXECUTION IMPACT"




Most states prohibit capital defendants from introducing testimony
during the sentencing phase of death penalty cases about the effect
that their execution would have on their family and friends.' The pri-
mary explanation offered by courts that have considered and rejected
such testimony is that the effect of an execution on third parties is not
relevant to determining a capital defendant's culpability. 2 Only a few
courts presently allow defendants to introduce "execution impact"
testimony.3 Of these few, only the court in State v. Stevens4 addressed
the admissibility of "execution impact" testimony in detail. In Ste-
vens, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that third party impact evi-
dence is admissible because it circumstantially sheds light on the
defendant's character and might, therefore, provide some basis for im-
posing a sentence less than death.5
When courts address the issue of whether to admit "execution im-
pact" evidence during the sentencing phase of death penalty cases, the
threshold inquiry is whether such evidence is relevant to the capital
sentencing determination. Two lines of Supreme Court cases illustrate
the main theories of relevance that the Court has applied to admit
evidence during capital sentencing trials.6 One line of cases examines
only the admissibility of mitigation evidence,7 while the other line of
1. For a discussion of the law regarding execution impact evidence, see infra Part
III.
2. See State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1281-82 (Wash. 1997).
3. See Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1339 (Del. 1994); State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d
162, 168 (Or. 1994).
4. 879 P.2d 162 (Or. 1994).
5. See id at 168.
6. The two theories of relevance in the context of "execution impact" eidence
are based upon the retributive theory of punishment. This is the dominant theory
used by courts that have considered such evidence. See infra note 62.
7. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986) (admitting circum-
stantial evidence of character as mitigation evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (holding that a capital jury must consider evidence that tends to mitigate a
defendant's guilt); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-05 (1976) (holding
that capital sentencing determinations must be individualized). For a detailed discus-
sion of the mitigation theory of relevance, see infra Part II.A.
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cases considers the admissibility of both mitigation evidence and vic-
tim impact evidence. 8
Careful comparison of these two lines of cases reveals inconsisten-
cies in the Court's reasoning, which raises questions about whether
courts are wrong to exclude "execution impact" testimony during the
sentencing phase of death penalty trials.9 Specifically, the Court ap-
plies a different theory of relevance depending on which party offers
particular evidence in capital cases. While defendants are generally
limited to offering evidence relating to their "moral culpability," the
government, in addition to providing such evidence, is also permitted
to introduce testimony about the harm that the defendant has inflicted
on third parties. 10 This Note examines how courts' use of these two
theories of relevance leads to inequality and violates capital defend-
ants' Eighth Amendment rights. This Note suggests that courts
should apply uniform reasoning to all evidentiary determinations
made during capital penalty trials.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the
Supreme Court's regulation of death penalty statutes. Part II exam-
ines the two theories of relevance that courts use to determine the
admissibility of evidence in the sentencing phase of death penalty tri-
als. Part III discusses the state of the law regarding the admissibility
of "execution impact" evidence at penalty trials. Specifically, this part
looks at the majority and minority views on this issue, along with the
rationales offered by courts for the acceptance or rejection of such
evidence. Finally, part IV argues that courts must allow juries to con-
sider "execution impact" testimony as mitigation evidence. This part
analyzes two significant inconsistencies in courts' reasoning for their
exclusion of "execution impact" evidence.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The Supreme Court began regulating state administration of the
death penalty in 1972.1" In Furman v. Georgia,2 the Court held in a
per curiam opinion that the death penalty, as applied in the three
8. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (holding that victim
impact evidence is admissible in capital sentencing trials). Victim impact evidence is
evidence that informs the judge or jury of "the financial, physical, and psychological
impact of the crime on the victim and the victim's family." Black's Law Dictionary
655 (Pocket ed. 1996). For a detailed discussion of the harm theory of relevance, see
infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part IV (arguing that "execution impact" testimony must be admitted
as mitigation evidence).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 355, 361 (1995).
12. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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cases before it, was unconstitutional. 3 One of the cases involved an
appeal from a death sentence imposed for a murder conviction, while
the other two cases were appeals from death sentences imposed for
rape convictions.' 4 Furman represented a drastic change in courts' ap-
proach to capital sentencing. Prior to Furman, juries that rendered a
guilty verdict had to decide immediately whether to impose the death
penalty; they were not given any standards or additional information
to assist them in their sentencing determination.' 5
Although there was no majority opinion in Furman, the five concur-
ring opinions of the justices shed light on the Court's decision. The
core holding of the concurring justices' opinions was that the discre-
tionary jury systems in place at the time violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because these
systems produced arbitrary and capricious death penalty
determinations.
Significantly, the Furman Court did not hold that the death penalty
was per se unconstitutional.' 6 Rather, the concurring justices merely
concluded that the death penalty procedures in effect at that time vio-
lated capital defendants' Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment. Several justices left open the possibility that the
death penalty could survive constitutional scrutiny if certain proce-
dural safeguards were implemented. For example, Justice Douglas ex-
plained that the death penalty statutes at issue were unconstitutional
because the wide discretion and lack of guidance given to sentencing
juries resulted in discrimination through arbitrary and capricious re-
sults. 7 Douglas specifically reserved decision, however, on whether a
non-discretionary statute would be constitutional.IS Similarly, Justice
Stewart observed that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments would
not permit the death penalty to "be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed" as it had been under the statutes at issue, but he also im-
plied that he might find the death penalty constitutional under differ-
ent circumstances.' 9
13. See id. at 239-40; see also Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Capital Punish-
ment and the Judicial Process 96 (1994) (discussing the Court's holding that "the im-
position and infliction of the death penalty under arbitrary and randomly
administered systems in which juries are given unrestricted and unguided [sentencing]
discretion... constitutes 'cruel and unusual' punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments").
14. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
15. See Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties 73-74 (1991). Such
discretion inevitably led to "arbitrary and capricious" results. Id. Following Furman,
states began to provide a capital sentencing jury with many standards and much infor-
mation to aid it in its sentencing determination. See infra notes 21-37 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
17. See iL at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
18. See id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan also emphasized the unconstitutionality of discre-
tionary death penalty statutes. He concluded that "the State must not
arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment. This principle derives from the
notion that the State does not respect human dignity when, without
reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does
not inflict upon others."2 Thus, the Court delivered a clear message
to the states that their current death penalty systems were unconstitu-
tional, and that it was up to them to repair their punishment process.
In response to the Furman decision, states adopted statutes that
provided jurors with more guidance in making death sentence deter-
minations.2' To eliminate wholly arbitrary decisions and promote to
consistency, some states adopted statutes listing specific aggravating
and mitigating factors that a capital sentencing jury could consider in
its decision-making process.2" Other states enacted statutes that re-
quired a capital jury to impose the death penalty if the jury concluded
that certain conditions were met.23 The Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to review a number of these new laws in 1976.
In Gregg v. Georgia,2 4 the Court considered the constitutionality of
a death penalty statute that provided for a bifurcated trial with sepa-
rate guilt and sentencing phases.25 The statute also provided for fac-
tors to guide jurors' decision-making process with respect to
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.26 Specifically, the statute
listed ten aggravating factors that the jury could consider when mak-
ing its determination, including whether the defendant had a prior
capital felony conviction, whether the defendant committed the mur-
der while committing another capital felony, whether the defendant
committed the murder for pecuniary gain, and whether the circum-
stances of the murder were outrageously inhuman.27 Although the
jury could also consider aggravating and mitigating factors that were
not provided for by the statute, it could not impose the death penalty
unless it found at least one of the statutory factors present. 28 The
Court concluded that the statute was constitutional, explaining that:
[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a
carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition
20. See id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
21. See Capital Punishment in the United States: A Documentary History 148
(Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris eds., 1997) [hereinafter Capital Punishment].
22. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. See id. at 195.
26. See id. at 164-66; see also Capital Punishment, supra note 21, at 161 (discussing
the Court's reasoning in Gregg); Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 13, at 116 (same).
27. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9 (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (Supp.
1975)).
28. See id. at 164-65.
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these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifur-
cated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of
the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided
with standards to guide its use of the information.2 9
The Court found that the Georgia statute did, in fact, satisfy these
criteria by providing the capital jury with adequate guidance to pro-
tect Gregg's Eighth Amendment rights.30
The Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina3 1 on the same day
that it decided Gregg. In Woodson, the Court struck down a statute
that required the jury to impose the death penalty if it concluded that
certain circumstances were present in the case.32 The statute
provided:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in
wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery,
kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder
in the first degree and shall be punished with death.33
The Court held that the North Carolina statute was unconstitutional
for three reasons: (1) it was not useful as an indicator of contempo-
rary values regarding mandatory death sentences; (2) it did not pro-
vide a reasonable response to Furman's rejection of the discretionary
jury system; and (3) it did not allow the particularized consideration of
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defend-
ant. 4 Thus, Woodson introduced the notion of individualized sen-
tencing into death penalty jurisprudence.
Together, Furman, Gregg, and Woodson illustrate the requirements
that a death penalty statute must satisfy to survive constitutional scru-
tiny. First, the statute must provide capital juries with guided discre-
tion to achieve uniformity in sentencing.35 Second, the statute must
allow for individualized sentencing determinations based on evidence
of mitigating circumstances.36 These procedural safeguards are
29. Id. at 195.
30. See id at 206-07.
31. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
32. See id at 302-05.
33. Id. at 286 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (amended
1977)).
34. See id at 304 ("[,V]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration of the charac-
ter and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular of-
fense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death." (citation omitted)).




designed to assure that defendants are protected against arbitrary and
capricious death penalty determinations.37
Despite the Court's establishment of these safeguards, many com-
mentators began to suggest that the two goals of uniformity and indi-
vidualization were incompatible and could not co-exist within a single
capital sentencing scheme.38 The concerns of these commentators
proved to be justified; as subsequent Supreme Court cases have indi-
cated, the Court itself did not treat these two goals equally and began
to favor individualization over uniformity.39
For example, in Lockett v. Ohio,4" the Court struck down a state
statute that prevented the sentencing jury from considering the cir-
cumstances of the crime and the record and character of the offender
as mitigating factors.41 The Court explained that the statute created
the risk that a jury would impose the death penalty without consider-
ing factors that may justify a less severe punishment.4" In Booth v.
Maryland,43 the Court held, in a five-to-four opinion, that victim im-
pact statements are inadmissible in capital cases.44 The Court rea-
soned that these statements do not reflect a defendant's individual
moral culpability.45 The Court indicated that such statements tend to
lead jurors to base their decisions on emotion rather than reason, frus-
37. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) ("We now hold that the punish-
ment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.").
38. See, e.g., White, supra note 15, at 6 (discussing the existing tension between the
Supreme Court's goals of guided discretion and individualized sentencing); James S.
Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the
"Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 Geo. L.J. 757,757-60 (1978)
(same); Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1147, 1148 (1991)
(same).
39. See White, supra note 15, at 8 ("Because death is different, the Court deemed
it appropriate to apply safeguards designed to make capital sentencing procedures
more reliable."); Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the
Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. Rev. 493, 540-41 (1992).
The rationale underlying individualized capital sentencing determinations is that
"death is different," and, therefore, the capital penalty trial requires additional safe-
guards. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (observing that "the penalty of
death is qualitatively different" from any other sentence (citation omitted)); see also
Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 13, at 119 (noting that the death penalty is different
from other punishments); Markus Dirk Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When
the Axe is Ready to Strike, 41 Buff. L. Rev. 85, 119-20 (1993) (discussing the extra
protection afforded capital defendants because of the finality and severity of the
death penalty).
40. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
41. See id. at 589, 608-09. For a detailed discussion of Lockett, see infra notes 68-
77 and accompanying text.
42. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
43. 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
44. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
45. See id. at 504 ("The focus of a [victim impact statement] .. . is not on the
defendant, but on the character and reputation of the victim and the effect on his




trating the goal of uniformity in sentencing because a defendant's sen-
tence would differ according to the victim's moral worth. 6
In 1991, however, the Court shifted the focus of capital sentencing
trials away from the defendant and onto the victim. In Payne v. Ten-
nessee,47 Pervis Tyrone Payne appealed his conviction for first degree
murder of a mother and her two-year-old daughter, along with a con-
viction for assault with intent to murder the mother's three-year-old
son.' During the sentencing phase of the trial, the trial court permit-
ted the state to present testimony regarding the effect of the murders
on the three-year-old child.49 The state called the child's grandmother
as a witness, who testified that the child "cries for his mom. He
doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. And he
cries for his sister .... " 50
The Supreme Court affirmed Payne's conviction, overruling Booth
and holding that states could admit victim impact evidence in capital
sentencing trials.5 ' The Court found that the harm caused by the
crime is an important factor in determining the defendant's sen-
tence.52 In addition, the Court explained that victim impact evidence
illustrates each victim's "uniqueness as an individual human being."53
The Court summed up its holding as follows: "We are now of the view
that a State may properly conclude that for the jury to assess meaning-
fully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should
have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm
caused by the defendant."'
Payne, therefore, introduced a new category of evidence into the
capital sentencing determination: victim impact evidence. By al-
lowing the admission of such evidence, the Court shifted much of the
focus away from capital defendants and placed more emphasis on the
victims. Payne, however, did not provide much guidance regarding
the scope of admissible victim impact evidence. The Court left indi-
vidual states with broad discretion to determine what victim impact
evidence a capital jury would be permitted to consider.55
46. See id. at 505-06.
47. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
48. See id. at 811.
49. See id. at 814.
50. Id-
51. See id. at 827-30.
52. See id. at 820.
53. Id. at 823.
54. Id. at 825.
55. See Catherine Bendor, Defendants' Wrongs and Victims' Rights: Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 219, 241 (1992); Angela P. Harris, The Jurispni-
dence of Victimhood, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 87. For example, some states only allow
victim impact evidence that directly reflects on a defendant's moral culpability,
whereas other states admit victim impact statements that do nothing more than illus-
trate the grief caused by the defendant. Compare State v. Craig, No. 95-KA-2499, (La.
May 20, 1997) (unpublished appendix to 699 So. 2d 865) (holding that victim impact
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The Supreme Court, as evidenced by Payne, has come full circle
from the pre-Furman days of unguided discretion and lack of uniform-
ity in sentencing.5 6 Many commentators have criticized the Payne de-
cision for its apparent departure from the Court's previous attempts
to ensure that the use of the death penalty remains constitutional.57
For example, Catherine Bendor has argued that Payne undercuts the
Supreme Court's prior emphasis on the need for heightened proce-
dural protection for capital defendants.5 Robert Black criticized vic-
tim impact evidence by suggesting that it "does [victims] no obvious
good but may augment the state's ever increasing arsenal against the
individual."59 Despite such criticism, Payne remains the law today.
A closer examination of the Court's decisions in this area indicates
that this departure stems from an expansion of the type of evidence
that the Court has deemed to be relevant. Part II looks at the theories
of relevance on which the Court has based the admission of evidence
in capital sentencing cases.
II. THE THEORIES OF RELEVANCE UNDERLYING EVIDENCE
ADMITTED AT CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS
Supreme Court decisions indicate that there are two main catego-
ries of evidence that are relevant to the sentencing determination dur-
ing the penalty phase of a capital trial. The first category is evidence
relating to a defendant's moral culpability.60 The second category is
evidence of the harm caused by a defendant's actions.61 This part ex-
amines the Court's reasoning for finding these two categories of evi-
dence relevant in light of one of the predominant theories of
punishment underlying criminal law: the retributive theory.62 This
evidence is admissible to the extent it shows the defendant's knowledge of the victim's
character, and therefore reflects on the defendant's moral culpability),, available in
Westlaw, 95-2499 (La. 5/20/97), at *30 with Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1277-78
(Ind. 1997) (affirming as harmless the trial court's admission of victim impact testi-
mony, which "addressed the positive characteristics of the victim, the emotional im-
pact his death had on the family, and the family's request that [the defendant] receive
a death sentence . . ").
56. See Mann, supra note 39, at 541.
57. See, e.g., Bendor, supra note 55, at 242 (noting that the Payne decision "may be
a harbinger of future Court action to eliminate the special procedural safeguards es-
tablished for capital defendants in past Eighth Amendment jurisprudence"); Robert
C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Participation in Sen-
tencing, 39 Am. J. Juris. 225, 238 (1994) (arguing that victim impact evidence adds
very little to the "culpability calculation").
58. See Bendor, supra note 55, at 241-42.
59. Black, supra note 57, at 228.
60. See infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
62. The two main theories of punishment in criminal law are the retributive and
utilitarian theories of punishment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)("The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders."); see also Coyne & Entzeroth,
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examination reveals inconsistencies in the Court's reasoning that, in
turn, raise questions about whether courts are wrong to exclude "exe-
cution impact" evidence.
Retribution has two different definitions: (1) a defendant should be
punished according to his moral culpability; and (2) a defendant
should be punished according to the extent of the harm he caused.13
Courts have admitted evidence based on both of these definitions dur-
ing capital sentencing trials. Retribution based on a defendant's
moral culpability supports the admission of evidence that sheds light
on the defendant's character and the circumstances of the offensef 4
On the other hand, retribution based on the extent of harm caused by
a defendant supports the admission of evidence concerning the impact
of the defendant's crime on third parties.65 Until Payne, courts ad-
hered to the first definition of retribution and only admitted evidence
relating to a defendant's moral culpability during capital sentencing
trials.6 6 By departing from prior precedent and using the second defi-
nition of retribution to also allow capital juries to consider evidence of
the harm caused by defendants, Payne signaled an expansion in the
supra note 13, at 73-74, 78-79 (discussing the theoretical bases of retribution and de-
terrence); Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 21-25 (1972) (listing
various theories of punishment); Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 Wis.
L. Rev. 1931, 1931 (stating that arguments regarding theories of punishment relate to
"two broad camps": retribution and utilitarianism); Richard S. Murphy, Comment,
The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punish-
ment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1303, 1306 (1988) (-Justifications for
punishment ... usually fall into one of two categories: retributive or utilitarian.");
Christopher Adams Thorn, Note, Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient
Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. Cal. L Rev. 199, 200 (1983)
("[J]ustifications for capital punishment focus on deterrence and retribution.").
This Note focuses on the retributive notion of punishment because it is the theory
under which mitigation and victim impact evidence is relevant and admissible. See,
e.g., Bendor, supra note 55, at 234 ("[T]he only justification [for punishment] to which
victim impact evidence directly relates is retribution."); cf Murphy, supra, at 1306
(noting that "[a] particular penalty may have both retributive and utilitarian elements,
but the theories in general are in opposition"); Thorn, supra, at 200-02 (highlighting
that justifications for capital punishment focus on both deterrence and retribution).
63. See Bendor, supra note 55, at 234; Murphy, supra note 62, at 1319-20; see also
Black's Law Dictionary 549 (Pocket ed. 1996) (defining retribution as: either (1) "the
theory that a criminal should be punished in proportion to the harm that he or she
caused," or (2) "[r]epayment").
64. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (finding that an individu-
alized decision based on a defendant's moral culpability is essential in capital cases).
65. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (holding that the spe-
cific harm caused by the defendant is relevant to the sentencing decision).
66. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987) (explaining that victim
impact statements are inadmissible during capital sentencing trials because "[t]he fo-
cus of a [victim impact statement] ... is not on the defendant, but on the character
and reputation of the victim and the effect on his family. These factors may be wholly
unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant."), overrued by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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scope of evidence that is relevant to capital sentencing
determinations.67
A. The Relevance of Evidence of Mitigating Circumstances
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment mandates
that a capital jury consider any evidence that tends to mitigate a de-
fendant's moral culpability.68 The Court established this principle in
Lockett v. Ohio,6 9 which held that capital juries must be allowed to
consider any factor that reflects on a defendant's character, record, or
the circumstances of the offense.7" In that case, Sandra Lockett had
helped devise a plan with several others to rob a pawn broker's shop
because some of her friends needed money.71 Although the perpetra-
tors did not plan to kill the pawn shop owner, one of the participants
accidentally shot and killed the owner during the robbery. 72 Lockett
was outside the store, waiting to drive the getaway car while the rob-
bery and shooting took place.73 She was convicted of aggravated mur-
der and aggravated robbery, and she received a death sentence.74
Ohio's death penalty statute explicitly precluded the sentencing judge
from considering as mitigation evidence such factors as Lockett's
character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, or
her minor part in the crime.7
The Court found that Ohio's limitation violated Lockett's Eighth
Amendment rights because it prohibited the sentencer from making
an individualized determination of her moral culpability based on all
of the mitigation evidence available.76 Specifically, the Court found
that:
[Tihe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sen-
tencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death .... The considerations that account for
the wide acceptance of individualization of sentences in noncapital
cases surely cannot be thought less important in capital cases.
Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so pro-
67. See Mann, supra note 39, at 538.
68. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608. As one commentator observed, "Ostensibly,
Lockett v. Ohio does not deal with the admissibility of evidence. But by defining what
is constitutionally relevant to the death penalty determination, Lockett makes it clear
that the capital defendant has a broad right to present mitigating evidence at the
penalty trial." White, supra note 15, at 97.
69. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
70. See id. at 604.
71. See id. at 590.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 589.
75. See id. at 597 (referring to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04 (1975)).
76. See id. at 604.
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foundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the con-
clusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.
77
Thus, because Ohio's statute did not permit an individualized deci-
sion, the Court struck it down as unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Skipper v. South Carolina,78 the Court reiterated and
extended Lockett's emphasis on individualized death sentence deter-
minations.7 9 During the sentencing phase of his capital trial, Ronald
Skipper attempted to introduce the testimony of two jailers and one of
Skipper's visitors who were prepared to assert that he had "made a
good adjustment" during his period of imprisonment.80 Although the
Court recognized that this evidence did not bear directly on Skipper's
moral culpability, it held that the evidence should nonetheless have
been admitted because a capital sentencing jury must be allowed to
consider any evidence that might provide the basis for a sentence less
than death."' By adopting such a broad interpretation of what consti-
tuted mitigation evidence under Lockett, the Court extended the no-
tion of relevant mitigation evidence to that which may even indirectly
bear on the defendant's moral culpability.
Although the Court emphasized the individualization of the defend-
ant in Lockett and Skipper, it has also recognized the possibility that
juries might be improperly swayed by the sympathetic aspects of miti-
gation evidence. For example, in California v. Brown,s the Court up-
held the constitutionality of anti-sympathy jury instructions given in
an attempt to prevent the jury from making its decision based on emo-
tion rather than reason in a death penalty case.s3 According to the
Court, a trial judge may instruct a capital jury to consider all of the
aggravating and mitigating evidence presented, but not to base its de-
cision on an emotional response to such evidence.' Read together,
Lockett, Skipper, and Brown indicate the Court's attempt to ensure
that capital juries consider all evidence that might relate to a defend-
ant's moral culpability, while using that evidence to reach a reasoned,
moral sentencing determination. 5
77. I& at 604-05 (footnotes omitted).
78. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
79. See i. at 4-5.
80. Id. at 3.
81. See id. at 4-5.
82. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
83. See id. at 543.
84. See id
85. See id at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he sentence imposed at the pen-
alty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's background,
character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."); see also Dubber,
supra note 39, at 111-12 (discussing the need to eliminate emotional sentencing deter-
minations in racially charged sentencing hearings); Harris, supra note 55, at 89 (em-




B. The Relevance of the Harm Caused by the Crime
Beginning with Payne v. Tennessee,86 the Supreme Court expanded
the scope of what type of evidence is relevant in the capital sentencing
phase of a trial by shifting to the second view of retribution: punish-
ment should be based on the harm caused by the defendant.87 In
Payne, the Court expressly rejected the notion that only evidence re-
lated to a defendant's moral culpability is admissible at a capital sen-
tencing trial.88 The Court explained that by removing all of the limits
on a defendant's right to introduce mitigating evidence, prior cases
had "unfairly weighted the scales" in capital trials towards the defend-
ant.89 Therefore, in an attempt to "level the playing field," the Court
held that states were now permitted to introduce victim impact
testimony.90
Consideration of the actual harm that a defendant inflicts on a vic-
tim is pervasive in criminal law.9' In Payne, the Court traced the his-
tory of the significance of harm to sentencing decisions from Biblical
times through the twentieth century.' The Court explained that, over
time, the notion of the harm caused by a defendant has become a
guiding principle of sentencing determinations.93 As the Court ob-
served, "Wherever judges in recent years have had discretion to im-
pose sentence, the consideration of the harm caused by the crime has
been an important factor in the exercise of that discretion. '94
Payne extended the category of evidence relevant to the sentencing
determination to include the impact of the defendant's actions on
third parties.95 Under Payne, victim impact testimony is relevant be-
cause it indicates the degree of social harm that the defendant caused
86. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
87. See id. at 825.
88. See id. (rejecting Booth's reasoning that only evidence reflecting on a defend-
ant's moral culpability is relevant to the sentencing determination); see also Valerie
Finn-DeLuca, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 403, 419 (1994)
(citing Justice Stevens's dissent in Payne for the proposition that Payne "abandons
rules of relevance that are older than the Nation itself").
89. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
90. See id. at 827.
91. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 1325-27 ("This practical relevance of result [i.e.,
harm] ... is pervasive in criminal law."). Indeed, criminal law generally categorizes
punishment according to the harm inflicted by the defendant. See id. at 1326. For
example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines require an increase in a defendant's sen-
tence if certain objective factors are present. See id. (citing U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements (1987)). The harm caused
by a defendant as a result of his or her actions is a "prominent aspect" of these fac-
tors. See id.
92. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 819-25.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 820.
95. See id. at 825 ("Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of




to others as a result of his or her actions.96 Such testimony includes
evidence of the effect of the victim's death on third parties because it
sheds light on the victim's character and is thus indicative of the loss
suffered by society caused by the death of the victim.
As a result of the Payne decision, the Court reversed what it per-
ceived as a trend toward courts providing too much protection to de-
fendants in death penalty cases. In its attempt to "level the playing
field," however, the Court has gone too far and "unfairly weighted the
scales"9 7 toward the government. To combat this problem, many de-
fendants have argued that if the government is allowed to introduce
victim impact evidence, then defendants should be permitted to intro-
duce "execution impact" evidence. Part III looks at the decisions of
courts that have considered this argument.
M. THE STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF "EXEcUTION IMPACT" EVIDENCE
A number of state courts have addressed the issue of whether a
defendant should be allowed to introduce testimony about the effect
that the defendant's execution would have on his or her family. The
majority of these courts have excluded such evidence as irrelevant to
the capital sentencing determination. In fact, of all the courts that
have handled this issue, only one has held such evidence admissible. 9
This part examines several of these cases and describes the various
lines of reasoning that courts have used to admit or exclude "execu-
tion impact" evidence.
A. Majority View: "Execution Impact" Evidence is Inadmissible
in Capital Sentencing Trials
Most courts that have addressed the admissibility of "execution im-
pact" evidence have held that such evidence does not reflect on any
mitigating factor of the defendant's character and, therefore, is irrele-
vant to the sentencing determination.
96. See id.
97. Id at 822.
98. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
99. See State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 167-68 (Or. 1994).
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The supreme courts of Washington,1"' New Jersey,' California,"~
Mississippi, 1°3 and Florida"° 4 have explicitly held that "execution im-
pact" evidence is inadmissible.
Stenson v. State illustrates a defendant's attempt to introduce, as
mitigating evidence, testimony regarding the impact his execution
would have on his family. Darold Ray Stenson appealed his convic-
tion of first-degree murder and his death sentence for killing his wife
and another man.' 5 During the penalty phase of his trial, Stenson
sought to introduce testimony from his father-in-law and sister-in-law
about the impact that his execution would have on his three chil-
dren.0 6 The trial court did not allow Stenson to introduce such testi-
mony.10 7 On appeal, Stenson argued, among other things, that: (1)
the court's refusal to admit "'execution impact' evidence violated his
right to present mitigation evidence"; and (2) if the victim's family had
the right to present victim impact evidence, then the Equal Protection
Clausei s required that he have the right to present "execution im-
pact" evidence as well.'0 9
The Washington Supreme Court did not address Stenson's equal
protection claim because the trial court had not admitted any victim
impact testimony." 0 Therefore, according to the court, Stenson's
equal protection, quid-pro-quo argument was moot."' The court did
100. See State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1282 (Wash. 1997) (holding that "the po-
tential impact of the Defendant's execution on third parties is not relevant").
101. See State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 713 (N.J. 1996) ("[M]itigating evidence that
focuses on the potential impact [of an execution] on a third party is not relevant to a
defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense, and therefore could
properly be excluded."); State v. DeFrisco, 645 A.2d 734,771 (N.J. 1994) (holding that
the exclusion of evidence relating to the impact the defendant's execution would have
on his mother was proper).
102. See People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 459 (Cal. 1995) (holding "execution im-
pact" evidence irrelevant to the capital sentencing determination).
103. See Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1123, 1134 (Miss. 1997) ("[Execution impact]
testimony is not relevant to the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of
the offense .... "); Turner v. State, 573 So. 2d 657, 667 (Miss. 1990) (finding that
testimony concerning the impact of an execution on a defendant's family "is not rele-
vant to the consideration of whether the death sentence should be imposed").
104. See Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 654 (Fla. 1997) ("The impact the defend-
ant's family will feel as a result of the defendant's execution does not mitigate the
harm caused by the crime and thus is not similarly relevant or authorized.").
105. See Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1245-48.
106. See id. at 1278.
107. See id. at 1278-79.
108. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
109. See Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1279-80.
110. See id. at 1280. At the time of Stenson's trial, the Washington Supreme Court
had not yet ruled on the admissibility of victim impact statements in capital cases. See
id. at 1279. After Stenson's trial, but before his appeal, the Washington Supreme
Court held victim impact testimony admissible during capital cases. See id. (citing
State v. Gentry, 888 P.2d 1105 (Wash. 1995)).
111. See id. at 1280.
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address, however, Stenson's claim that the trial court had violated his
right to present mitigation evidence. The court rejected this claim,
explaining that "execution impact" evidence did not reflect on Sten-
son's character, record, or the circumstances of his offense, and was
therefore irrelevant to the sentencing decision." 2 The court further
reasoned that such evidence was unnecessary because the trial court
had already allowed evidence of Stenson's relationships with his fam-
ily and friends." 3
Although Stenson provides the most comprehensive explanation
given by a court for excluding "execution impact" evidence, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court left unresolved the question of whether such
evidence would have been admissible if the prosecution had intro-
duced victim impact testimony. As the court observed, "[s]ince the
trial court did not allow any victim impact evidence, Stenson's conten-
tion that it violates equal protection to disallow 'execution impact' ev-
idence when victim impact evidence is admitted is irrelevant in this
case.""' 4 Other state courts have, in fact, been faced with such a situa-
tion, and most of them have concluded that "execution impact" evi-
dence may be excluded despite the simultaneous admission of victim
impact evidence.
For example, in Burns v. State,"5 the defendant, David Bums, ap-
pealed his conviction of first-degree murder for killing a police of-
ficer." 6 The trial court had admitted victim impact testimony during
the penalty trial."' The trial court did not, however, allow Burns to
proffer testimony from his sister and two daughters about the effect
that his execution would have on them and other family members." 8
On appeal, Burns argued that the trial judge should have admitted
this "execution impact" testimony because: (1) the evidence reflected
on Bums's "character and background and was therefore mitigat-
ing;"" 9 and (2) the Due Process Clause mandated the introduction of
the "execution impact" evidence because the State introduced victim
impact evidence."2
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected both of Burns's argu-
ments.' The court did not explain in detail its decision to exclude
such evidence, but summarily concluded that "the trial court did not
112. See id at 1281 ("[N]othing limits the traditional authority of a court to ex-
clude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record,
or the circumstances of his offense." (citation omitted)).
113. See id. at 1282.
114. ld. at 1280.
115. 699 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1997).
116. See id. at 647-49.
117. See id. at 652-53.






abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony concerning the sen-
tence Burns' [sic] should receive.' 2 2 The court also rejected Burns's
argument that due process required the introduction of "execution im-
pact" testimony because the State was permitted to introduce victim
impact evidence. The court simply stated that "[w]e do not find merit
in this kind of quid pro quo assertion.... The impact the defendant's
family will feel as a result of the defendant's execution does not miti-
gate the harm caused by the crime and thus is not.., relevant .... 123
Similarly, in Wilcher v. State,2 4 the defendant appealed his convic-
tion of capital murder and his death sentence for a "gruesome double
murder and robbery."'" He argued that his trial was "fundamentally
unfair" because the trial judge allowed the victim's family, but not his
own family, to give their "subjective impressions about the effect of
the crime and the alternatives for punishment on them.' 2 6 The Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court relied on Payne to uphold the trial court's de-
cision to admit evidence about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family.12 7 At the same time, the court held that Wilcher's
''execution impact" evidence was "not relevant to the defendant's
character, record, or the circumstances of the offense and that the ex-
clusion of such evidence [was] proper. "128
B. Minority View: "Execution Impact" Evidence is Admissible at
the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials
While most courts have held that "execution impact" evidence is
irrelevant to the sentencing phase of a capital trial, at least one court
has held that such evidence is, in fact, relevant. In State v. Stevens, the
Supreme Court of Oregon held that the trial court erred by refusing to
admit "execution impact" testimony as mitigating evidence during the
sentencing determination.'29 The defendant, convicted of aggravated
murder, was sentenced to death. 3 ' On the first appeal from his con-
viction, the court affirmed the jury's guilt determination but vacated
the death sentence because the trial court had given instructions that
122. Id.
123. Id. Further, the court observed that while the admission of victim impact evi-
dence was authorized by statute, the similar admission of "execution impact" evi-
dence was not. See id.; see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141(7) (West 1996) (authorizing
the introduction of victim impact evidence).
The court's choice of words suggests that it confused the two theories of relevance
discussed supra in part II, because the court spoke of "mitigating the harm" rather
than "mitigating culpability" or "being evidence of specific harm."
124. 697 So. 2d 1123 (Miss. 1997).
125. Id. at 1126.
126. Id. at 1133.
127. See id. at 1134.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. See State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 168 (Or. 1994).
130. See id. at 162.
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limited the jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence. 131 On re-
mand, the jury again sentenced Stevens to death. 132 On his second
appeal, Stevens argued that the trial court erred in excluding "execu-
tion impact" evidence, thereby violating his Eighth Amendment right
to present any evidence that mitigated his culpability. 133
Stevens made three offers of proof that the Oregon Supreme Court
found had been improperly excluded."M Stevens had sought to intro-
duce testimony from his wife, who had been called as a government
witness. 135 First, Stevens proffered the following testimony:
Q: What is your opinion about what is best for [your daughter]?
A: I think to know that her dad was executed by the State would be
destructive to her.
Q: In what way?
A: Well, emotional. I'm sure she would feel responsible somehow.
It would not be good for her. I mean, she knows he's going to be in
there the rest of his life, and that's, you know, that's a better story
than they killed him.
You know, it's just not going to be good for her at all. I mean, she
knows that he's going to be in prison the rest of his life. She'll never
hug him. She knows he's going to grow old and gray and die. But
she doesn't know they're going to kill him.13 6
Next, Stevens sought to introduce his wife's testimony that she
would allow her daughter to visit Stevens in jail: "[I]n time when [my
daughter] can fully accept and everything for what everything is worth
and its face value is, if she really would want to see her dad, I would
do what she wanted to do for herself .... ,,137 Finally, Stevens tried to
introduce the following testimony elicited from his wife:
Q: [I]s there something about... Stevens, his character and how he
associated with and worked with his daughter that you feel that she
should be given an opportunity to see if she wants to rekindle that
condition, because of what he was in the past?
131. See id.
132. See id at 163.
133. See id In addition to his constitutional claim, Stevens argued that the trial
court violated an Oregon statue that required all mitigation evidence to be presented
to a capital jury. See id. at 165-66 (citing Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.150 (1989)). Because the
Oregon statute tracks the language of Lockett almost identically, for purposes of this
analysis the statutory and constitutional claim are considered the same.
134. See id. at 163.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 163-64.
137. Id at 164.
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A: [S]he's old enough to handle it and understand it, I'm sure she's
still going to, you know, want to see him for maybe some reason or
another.
Q: And that's because of his early years with him [sic]?
A: He is her father.' 38
Stevens argued that these three excerpts from his wife's testimony
were relevant because "testimony about the anticipated negative ef-
fect of his execution on his daughter suggests something particular
about his character and background.' 1 39 The court agreed with Ste-
vens, vacating his death sentence for the second time and remanding
the case to the trial court.14 0 In reaching its decision, the court indi-
rectly relied on Payne to hold that testimony from relatives of a capital
defendant might provide insight into the defendant's character.'14
The court explained:
While the witness's testimony may not offer any direct evidence
about defendant's character or background, it does offer circum-
stantial evidence. A rational juror could infer from the witness's
testimony that she believed that her daughter would be affected ad-
versely by defendant's execution because of something positive
about his relationship with his daughter and because of something
positive about defendant's character or background. Put differ-
ently, a rational juror could infer that there are positive aspects
about defendant's relationship with his daughter that demonstrate
that defendant has the capacity to be of emotional value to others.
In that inference, a juror could find an aspect of defendant's charac-
ter or background that could justify a sentence of less than death. 1 2
The court disagreed with other state courts that have held that "execu-
tion impact" evidence is irrelevant because it does not reflect on a
capital defendant's character.143 According to the Oregon court, if
such evidence circumstantially reflects the defendant's character, it is
relevant mitigation evidence that the jury must consider. 144
Despite the Stevens court's formidable and persuasive reasoning, a
majority of state courts have rejected the quid-pro-quo argument that
if the prosecution is entitled to introduce victim impact evidence, then
defendants should be entitled to introduce "execution impact" evi-
dence. Part IV argues that such a quid-pro-quo approach is essential
to maintain consistent reasoning, which is especially important when a
person's life hangs in the balance. Specifically, part IV suggests that if
courts allow the government to use victim impact evidence as circum-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 167 (footnote omitted).
140. See id. at 168.
141. See id. at 167-68.
142. Id. at 168.
143. See supra notes 100-28 and accompanying text.
144. See Stevens, 879 P.2d at 168.
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stantial evidence of a victim's character, then these courts should also
admit "execution impact" testimony as circumstantial evidence of a
defendant's character.
IV. COURTS MUST ADMIT "EXECUTION IMPACT" TESTIMONY
As MITIGATION EVIDENCE
This part argues that courts' refusal to admit "execution impact"
testimony as mitigation evidence violates capital defendants' Eighth
Amendment right to individualized sentencing determinations. Spe-
cifically, this part points out two glaring inconsistencies in these
courts' reasoning. First, to the extent that courts admit victim impact
evidence because it circumstantially sheds light on a victim's charac-
ter, it is inconsistent for these courts to simultaneously exclude "exe-
cution impact" evidence which circumstantially sheds light on the
defendant's character. Second, this part points out the inconsistency
in excluding "execution impact" evidence because of repetition, while
blatantly ignoring an identical repetition argument when the govern-
ment offers victim impact evidence. Both of these inconsistencies re-
sult in clear violations of capital defendants' Eighth Amendment
rights.
A. Execution Impact Evidence Is Reflective
of a Defendant's Character
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment guaran-
tees the right of capital defendants to individualized sentencing deter-
minations.'45 By excluding "execution impact" evidence on the
ground that it does not reflect on capital defendants' moral culpabil-
ity, courts violate this right. Courts must allow defendants to intro-
duce "execution impact" testimony because it does, in fact, shed light
on a capital defendant's character and, therefore, must be admitted as
mitigation evidence under Lockett.146
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has determined that there
are two categories of evidence that are relevant in the sentencing
stage of a death penalty trial: evidence reflecting a defendant's moral
culpability, and evidence reflecting the amount of harm caused by the
victim's death. 47 In contrast, while most courts allow the government
to introduce victim impact evidence as an indication of how much
harm a defendant caused, the same courts inexplicably reject "execu-
tion impact" testimony as evidence that mitigates the defendant's
moral culpability. The problem with this reasoning is that these courts
145. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976).
146. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
147. See supra Part II.
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favor one type of character evidence over another, resulting in severe
prejudice to defendants.
In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court admitted third party im-
pact testimony.'48 The Court explained that victim impact evidence
(i.e., evidence of harm) "is designed to show.., each victim's 'unique-
ness as an individual human being,' whatever the jury might think the
loss to the community resulting from his death might be." '149 In addi-
tion, the Court explained that such evidence illustrated the specific
harm caused by the defendant because it demonstrated the collateral
effects of the death, including the "unique loss to society and in partic-
ular to his family."' 50 Thus, according to the Court, evidence of harm
to third parties is relevant because it reveals both the individuality of
the victim and the harm that the defendant caused to society. 151
Evidence of the victim's individuality necessarily sheds light on the
victim's character. If the victim had a loving family and friends who
testified at the penalty trial, the jury could infer that the victim was a
good person. If, on the other hand, the victim alienated all of his fam-
ily and friends, the government would probably not proffer any victim
impact testimony. Consequently, the jury could draw a negative infer-
ence about the victim's character from the absence of victim impact
testimony.' 52 In both scenarios, third party impact testimony might
circumstantially shed light on the jury's assessment of the victim's
character, which subsequently sheds light on the harm caused to soci-
ety by the victim's death.
Nevertheless, most courts do not allow defendants to use circum-
stantial character evidence to shed light on their own character or to
illustrate the collateral effects that yet another death-the defend-
ant's-would have on the community. 53 These courts reject the idea
that testimony regarding the impact of an execution on a defendant's
family reveals something about the defendant's character. As the
court in State v. Loftin explained, "[M]itigating evidence that focuses
on the potential impact [of an execution] on a third party is not rele-
vant to a defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the
offense, and therefore could properly be excluded."' 54
148. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825-26 (1991).
149. Id. at 823.
150. Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
151. See id.
152. The Payne Court explicitly stated that "victim impact evidence is not offered
to encourage comparative judgments . I..." Id. at 823. Nevertheless, when victim
impact evidence is available, a jury may use such evidence to formulate an impression
about who the victim was.
153. See supra notes 100-04 (listing cases that held that "execution impact" evi-
dence was inadmissible).
154. State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 713 (N.J. 1996); see also Wilcher v. State, 697 So.
2d 1123, 1134 (Miss. 1997) ("[S]uch ['execution impact'] testimony is not relevant to
the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense ... and the
exclusion of such evidence is proper."); State v. Stenson, 940 P.2d 1239, 1282 (Wash.
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This rejection, however, is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding mitigating evidence. As discussed
earlier, the capital defendant is entitled to present any evidence which
relates to his own character.15 5 If, like a victim, the capital defendant
had family and friends who loved him and would miss him after exe-
cution, a jury might infer that the defendant should not be executed.
Indeed, "execution impact" is evidence of character. If the defendant
did not possess good character, then people would not miss him.
The exclusion of "execution impact" testimony is particularly troub-
ling when one considers the Supreme Court's attempt to protect capi-
tal defendants by requiring heightened procedural safeguards in death
penalty cases.' 56 Lockett and Skipper interpreted the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments as affording capital defendants broad access
to any evidence that might provide the basis for a sentence less than
death.'57 Given such language, it is surprising that a majority of courts
have not allowed defendants to use third party impact statements as
circumstantial evidence of their character. Not only do courts limit
the previously broad category of mitigation evidence that defendants
are allowed to introduce under Lockett and Skipper, but, by admitting
victim impact testimony, they also expand the amount and kind of
evidence that the government may use in mounting its case against the
defendant.
B. "Execution Impact" Evidence is No More Repetitive
than Victim Impact Evidence
In addition to their inconsistent treatment of circumstantial evi-
dence of character, courts rely on additional flawed reasoning to ex-
clude "execution impact" evidence. One justification that courts have
offered for excluding "execution impact" testimony is that it is unnec-
essarily repetitive because evidence regarding the defendant's charac-
ter had already been introduced to the jury through testimony
regarding the defendant's family relationships. Nevertheless, these
same courts admit victim impact testimony even though such testi-
mony often contains evidence previously heard by the jury or avail-
able in another form.
For example, in State v. Loftin, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that even if the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence regard-
ing the impact that the defendant's execution would have on his wife
and children as mitigating factors, the error would have been harmless
because the defendant had already introduced character evidence that
1997) ("[T]he potential impact of the Defendant's execution on third parties is not
relevant.").
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
157. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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directly focused on his relationship with his wife and children.' 58 Sim-
ilarly, in State v. Stenson, the Washington Supreme Court justified its
decision to exclude "execution impact" testimony by indicating that
the trial court allowed character and background evidence, including
testimony about Stenson's relationship with his family and friends and
particular circumstances of the crime. 159 Thus, these courts have sug-
gested that third party impact testimony is unnecessary because a cap-
ital defendant can introduce the same evidence through direct
character testimony during the penalty trial.
Although this argument for exclusion, in and of itself, is not without
some merit, courts continue to admit victim impact testimony during
the penalty trial even though evidence relating to the victim has often
already come before the jury in other forms. The same reasoning
courts use to exclude "execution impact" testimony, therefore, could
be used to exclude victim impact testimony. Ironically, in Payne, the
Supreme Court relied on the argument that evidence regarding the
victim had already been presented to the jury to support its holding
that victim impact evidence should be admissible during capital pen-
alty trials. 6 ' The Court explained that "[i]n many cases the evidence
relating to the victim is already before the jury at least in part because
of its relevance at the guilt phase of the trial."'' Thus, the Court
reasoned that many of the defendant's objections to victim impact tes-
timony were moot.
In sum, courts should apply the same reasoning to every evidentiary
determination made during capital sentencing cases. Courts can turn
to State v. Stevens as a model for harmonizing the inconsistencies that
result from excluding "execution impact" evidence in cases where vic-
tim impact evidence is admitted. 62 These courts should acknowledge
that "execution impact" testimony does provide circumstantial evi-
dence of the defendant's character and that it is no more repetitive to
admit "execution impact" evidence than it is to admit victim impact
evidence. Until courts apply such reasoning, they will continue to vio-
late capital defendants' constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
In 1972, the Supreme Court attempted to ensure that capital de-
fendants' constitutional rights were adequately protected. 63 With its
1991 decision in Payne, however, the Supreme Court retreated from
its prior emphasis on the protection of the defendant in capital sen-
tencing proceedings and indicated its willingness to allow the states to
158. See Loftin, 680 A.2d at 713.
159. See Stenson, 940 P.2d at 1282.
160. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991).
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 11-37 and accompanying text.
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fashion their own capital sentencing jurisprudence. 1" The inconsis-
tent reasoning that the majority of courts employ to make evidentiary
determinations during capital penalty trials indicates that courts do
not always protect capital defendants' Eighth Amendment rights. In
fact, present day death penalty jurisprudence bears a significant re-
semblance to the pre-Furman days of unguided discretion that the
Court held to be unconstitutional. The only way for courts to rectify
this highly disturbing development is to admit "execution impact" evi-
dence during capital sentencing, which gives defendants the crucial
constitutional protections to which they, like all of us, are entitled.
164. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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